In public

Research

We do not publish client names. We publish research.

Overview

Our work in public is devoted to the techniques adversaries actually use, and to the means by which defenders can recognize them.

Every dossier is written from first-hand analysis of the sample or system in question, never from summaries of other people's work.

Featured dossier

In preparation

SheetRat: A .NET Implant Reaching for the Boot Chain

A 64-bit .NET assembly that mounts the EFI System Partition and enumerates kernel security features, behavior rarely seen outside bootkits. We take it apart across five parts, from the logic that triggers it to the capability it carries but never uses.

Sample

64-bit .NET assembly

SHA-256

0ffec6082c…

Tooling

ILSpy, IDA Pro

In five parts

  1. IThe bootkit trigger logic
  2. IIDormant capability
  3. IIIThe top-level classes
  4. IVCommand and control, and detection
  5. VDynamic analysis

The Register

  • ZB-R-2026-01

    Malware Analysis

    SheetRat: A .NET Implant Reaching for the Boot Chain

    A 64-bit .NET assembly that mounts the EFI System Partition and enumerates kernel security features, behavior rarely seen outside bootkits. We take it apart across five parts, from the logic that triggers it to the capability it carries but never uses.

    In preparation
  • ZB-R-2026-02

    Identity

    One Token, Many Doors: Family Refresh Tokens in Entra ID

    How Microsoft's family of client IDs allows a single refresh token to be exchanged across first-party applications, how role-assignable groups widen what an intruder can reach, and what defenders can watch for.

    Forthcoming
  • ZB-R-2026-03

    Malware Analysis

    Rootkits, Recycled: Inside a C# Rootkit

    A rootkit written in C#, decompiled and examined to show how malicious code is borrowed, adapted and redeployed, and why reuse leaves fingerprints a defender can follow.

    Forthcoming
Archive on Medium

Areas of focus

I

Malware analysis

Technical dissections of malware families, from loaders to rootkits, with the detections to match.

II

Identity

Attack paths across Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, and the means to close them.

III

Detection engineering

YARA, Sigma and Suricata rules derived from our own analyses, written to be deployed rather than admired.

IV

Application privacy

What applications and their embedded SDKs quietly collect and transmit.

YARA · Sigma · Suricata

The Detection Library

The rules that emerge from our dossiers will be published openly, for any defender to deploy in their own environment.

Opening with ZB-R-2026-01

By request

Private distribution

Receive each dossier before it is published, together with its detection rules. Distribution is by request only, and the list is never shared.

Every engagement begins with a conversation.

A senior member of our team responds personally within 48 hours, under NDA should you prefer.

Request a Private Briefing